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Abstract—Recent research has demonstrated that Intel’s SGX
is vulnerable to various software-based side-channel attacks. In
particular, attacks that monitor CPU caches shared between the
victim enclave and untrusted software enable accurate leakage of
secret enclave data. Known defenses assume developer assistance,
require hardware changes, impose high overhead, or prevent only
some of the known attacks. In this paper we propose data location
randomization as a novel defensive approach to address the threat
of side-channel attacks. Our main goal is to break the link
between the cache observations by the privileged adversary and
the actual data accesses by the victim. We design and implement a
compiler-based tool called DR.SGX that instruments enclave code
such that data locations are permuted at the granularity of cache
lines. We realize the permutation with the CPU’s cryptographic
hardware-acceleration units providing secure randomization. To
prevent correlation of repeated memory accesses we continuously
re-randomize all enclave data during execution. Our solution
effectively protects many (but not all) enclaves from cache attacks
and provides a complementary enclave hardening technique that
is especially useful against unpredictable information leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) [15], [32] enables
execution of security-critical application code, called enclaves,
in isolation from the untrusted system software. In particular,
SGX was designed to ensure confidentiality of enclave data
and integrity of enclave execution. Protections in the processor
prevent a malicious OS from directly reading or modifying
enclave memory at runtime. Processors are also equipped
with keys that allow encryption for persistent storage (seal-
ing) and remote verification of enclave software configuration
(attestation). SGX enables development of applications and
online services with improved security; the architecture is
especially useful in cloud computing applications, where data
and computation can be outsourced to an external computing
infrastructure without having to fully trust the cloud provider
and its entire software stack.
a) Information leakage: Recent research has, however,
demonstrated that SGX isolation can be attacked by exploiting
information leakage through various software-based side chan-
nels. In SGX, memory management, including paging, is left
to the untrusted OS [15]. Consequently, the OS can force page
faults at any point of enclave execution and from the requested
pages learn (coarse-grained) enclave control flow information
or data access patterns [79]. Confidential enclave data can
also be inferred by monitoring CPU caches that are shared
between the enclave and untrusted software [9], [62], [49],
[27]. Compared to page-fault attacks, cache monitoring enables
more fine-grained information leakage at the granularity of
a single cache line (64 bytes on current Intel CPUs). Side-
channel attacks are a serious concern as they violate data
confidentiality and thus defeat one of the main benefits of SGX
— the ability to compute over private data on an untrusted
(cloud) platform.
In this paper we focus on information leakage through
shared caches. The problem of cache attacks has been ex-
tensively studied independently of SGX and several coun-
termeasures have been proposed. One common approach is
side-channel resilient software implementation, where the de-
veloper manually hardens the application code. For example,
the scatter-and-gather technique [11] is often used to protect
cryptographic implementations in which a look-up table is
accessed based on a secret key. Another common approach is
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [68] and Oblivious Execution [46],
[44], [43]. These techniques hide any data (or code) access by
using data encryption and repeated shuffling. Unfortunately,
without specialized hardware the performance overhead of
such approaches is extremely high. Also, new processor and
cache architectures have been proposed to prevent information
leakage. For example, Sanctum [16] partitions the L3 cache
and RPCache [73] randomizes cache eviction patterns. Fi-
nally, recent research has proposed SGX-specific side-channel
defenses. T-SGX [65] and De´ja´ Vu [13] use transactional
memory features to prevent attacks that repeatedly interrupt the
victim enclave. Cloak [28] uses transactional memory to render
an attacker’s cache observations oblivious, before accessing
sensitive memory content all cache lines are accessed. Cloak
relies on the SGX enclave developer to annotate sensitive
memory. Raccoon [58] attempts to hide accesses to developer-
annotated data.
b) Our goals and approach: The goal of our work is to
develop a generic and practical countermeasure against SGX
cache attacks. In particular, we focus on information leakage
due to secret-dependent data accesses, as those can effectively
leak fine-grained information such as complete cryptographic
keys [62], [49], [27] or genomic data used for person iden-
tification [9]. Our solution should meet the following high-
level requirements: as enclaves are often written by developers
who are not security experts, the defense should not rely
on the developer (in contrast to manual hardening and code
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
09
91
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 S
ep
 20
17
annotation); the performance overhead should be moderate
for various practical use (in contrast to ORAM and oblivious
execution); the defense should protect enclaves in the current
SGX architecture (in contrast to new hardware designs); and
the solution should apply to any cache attack strategy (in
contrast to point-defenses that, e.g., only detect attacks based
on repeated interrupts).
We assume the common SGX adversary model, where the
adversary controls the OS and any other system software.
The adversary uses cache monitoring techniques, such as
Prime+Probe [53], to obtain a trace of the victim enclave’s
memory accesses. Although all demonstrated cache attacks
exhibit significant noise in practice, we consider a powerful
adversary that is able to obtain a perfect memory access trace
at the granularity of cache lines. The adversary can monitor
any cache level (L1, L2 or L3) and run the victim repeatedly.
Our main idea is to transform the enclave code such that
all enclave data locations are randomized at fine granularity.
The enclave picks a secret randomization key and on every
data access computes a permutation for the accessed memory
address based on the key. As a result, the adversary cannot
map the observed (permuted) memory address to the actually
used address. Because all enclave data is randomized without
the need to understand its structure or semantics, we call our
approach semantic-agnostic data randomization.
Randomization is a well-known hardening technique, but
our approach is different from the existing solutions that
typically randomize application code by leveraging its known
structure (e.g., randomization at the granularity of functions
or code blocks). Due to the well-known difficulty of C and
C++ code analysis and pointer tracking, a similar semantic and
structure is not available for data [7]. Indeed, ASLR systems
like SGX-Shield [64] do not randomize enclave data and
therefore do not prevent recent cache attacks [9], [62], [49],
[27]. We propose a conceptually different approach that allows
randomization of enclave data regardless of its semantics.
c) Challenges and results: The secure and practical
realization of our approach imposes technical challenges. The
first is secure and efficient permutation computation under
adversarial cache monitoring. If the adversary is able to
derive information from the process of address permutation,
he can revert our randomization. The second challenge is the
performance impact imposed by the randomization. Computing
a permutation for every data access is expensive and causes
a high runtime overhead. The third main challenge is infor-
mation leakage through repeated memory accesses. Although
an individual access is effectively hidden from the adversary,
repetitive access patterns allow (permuted) address correlation
and thus leak information.
We design and implement a compiler-based tool called
DR.SGX (Data Location Randomization for SGX) that in-
struments enclave code at compile time such that all memory
locations used to store enclave data are permuted at cache-
line granularity during run time. The key techniques of our
tool include a secure permutation mechanism that computes
the permutation as small-domain encryption [6] using the
CPU’s cryptography hardware acceleration units (AES-NI).
Therefore, the permutation process itself leaks no informa-
tion to an adversary that monitors the cache. To increase
performance, we implement a “permutation cache” that stores
recently used address permutations. To increase the security of
our solution against correlation attacks due to repeated memory
accesses, we re-randomize enclave data probabilistically and
gradually during enclave execution. The randomization rate
is an adjustable parameter: more aggressive re-randomization
hides repeated memory access patterns better at the cost of
imposing a higher overhead.
We evaluate the performance of our tool and find that its
runtime overhead ranges from 3.39× to 9.33× depending on
the re-randomization rate. While this overhead is substantial,
we argue that it is still practical for many applications. In
comparison, state-of-the-art oblivious execution systems that
leverage customized hardware cause overheads from 5× to
15× [43], [46]. Our solution is software only.
We analyze the security of our solution and show that it
effectively prevents cache attacks on many types of enclaves.
However, as our solution re-randomizes enclave data locations
gradually and probabilistically (to improve performance), it
cannot eliminate all information leakage (similar to ORAM
and oblivious execution) and prevent all attacks. In particular,
correlation attacks on enclaves, where secret-dependent data
accesses immediately follow predictable access patterns, are a
limitation of our solution (see Section VII for details).
We see our approach as complementary to known side-
channel countermeasures. ORAM and oblivious execution pro-
vide strong protection with high cost. Manual hardening allows
elimination of known attacks. Our solution enables hardening
of enclaves against unpredictable information leakage (e.g.,
new attack vectors or sensitive enclave data that developers
would fail to mark) with practical and adjustable overhead.
DR.SGX can be used as the only or additional enclave hard-
ening technique depending on the deployment scenario.
d) Contributions: To summarize, this paper makes the
following main contributions:
• Novel approach. We propose a novel defensive ap-
proach called semantic agnostic data randomization
as a countermeasure against cache-based side-channel
attacks on SGX.
• New tool. We design and implement a compiler-
based tool called DR.SGX that instruments the code
to permute an enclave’s data memory at cache-line
granularity and re-randomizes it gradually.
• Evaluation. We evaluate the performance of our sys-
tem and find its overhead practical. We analyze the
security of our solution and show that it prevents many
cache attacks effectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we provide background information and Section III defines our
problem. Section IV presents our approach and system design,
and Section V details on our implementation. We evaluate
DR.SGX’s performance in Section VI and analyze its security
in Section VII. Section VIII provides discussion, Section IX
reviews related work, and Section X concludes the paper.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Intel SGX
SGX introduces a set of new CPU instructions for creating
and managing isolated software components, called enclaves,
that are isolated from all software running on the system,
including privileged software like the operating system (OS)
and the hypervisor [48], [34]. SGX assumes the CPU itself to
be the only trustworthy hardware component of the system,
i.e., enclave data is handled in plain-text only inside the CPU.
Data is stored unencrypted in the CPU’s caches and registers.
However, whenever data is moved out of the CPU, e.g., into
DRAM, it is encrypted and integrity protected.
The OS, although untrusted, is responsible for creating
and managing enclaves. It allocates memory for the enclaves,
manages virtual to physical address translation for the en-
clave’s memory and copies the initial data and code into
the enclave. However, all initialization actions of the OS are
recorded securely by SGX and can be verified by an external
party through (remote) attestation [3]. SGX’s sealing capability
enables persistent secure storage of data.
B. Cache Architecture
In the following we provide details of the Intel x86 cache
architecture [35], [33] using terminology from Intel docu-
ments [2]. We focus on the Intel Skylake processor generation,
i.e., the type of CPU we used for our implementation and
evaluation.1
Memory caching “hides” the latency of memory accesses
to the system’s dynamic random access memory (DRAM)
by keeping a copy of currently processed data in cache.
When a memory operation is performed, the cache controller
checks whether the requested data is already cached, and if
so, the request is served from the cache, called a cache hit,
otherwise cache miss. Due to higher cost (production, energy
consumption), caches are orders of magnitude smaller than
DRAM and only a subset of the memory content can be present
in the cache at any point in time.
For each memory access the cache controller has to check if
the data are present in the cache. Sequentially iterating through
the entire cache would be very expensive. Therefore, the cache
is divided into cache lines and for each memory address the
corresponding cache line can be quickly determined, the lower
bits of a memory address select the cache line. Hence, multiple
memory addresses map to the same cache line.
The current Intel CPUs have a three level hierarchy of
caches. The last level cache (LLC), also known as level 3 (L3)
cache, is the largest and slowest cache; it is shared between
all CPU-cores. Each CPU core has a dedicated L1 and L2
cache, but they are shared between the core’s simultaneous
multi-threading (SMT) execution units (also known as hyper-
threading).
C. SGX Side-Channel Attacks
It has been speculated that Intel SGX would be susceptible
to side-channel attacks since the early days of SGX [15]. Intel
1At the time of writing Intel SGX is available only on Intel Skylake and
Kaby Lake CPUs. To the best of our knowledge there are no differences in
the cache architecture between Skylake and Kaby Lake.
acknowledges the possibility of side-channel attacks on SGX
enclaves [36], however, considers them out of scope of the
SGX adversary model and delegates responsibility to protect
against side-channel attacks to the enclave developer: “Intel
SGX does not provide explicit protection from side-channel
attacks. It is the enclave developer’s responsibility to address
side-channel attack concerns.” [36].
Intel provides two recommendations in the SGX Developer
Guide [36] on how to counter side-channel attacks on enclaves.
A more general recommendation is that “[...] the application
enclave should use an appropriate crypto implementation that
is side channel attack resistant inside the enclave if side-
channel attacks are a concern.” [36]. A second recommen-
dation is with regard to the side-channel attack demonstrated
by Xu et al. [79]: “[...] aligning specific code and data blocks
to exist entirely within a single page” [36]. However, these
recommendations are not sufficient when considering cache-
based side-channel attacks on non-cryptographic implementa-
tions [10], [9].
Cache-based side-channel attacks can be classified with
respect to which memory content is targeted. On one hand,
code accesses can be observed to identify secret dependent
execution paths. On the other hand, data access can be targeted
to identify secret dependent data object usage. Both types of
attacks have been shown to successfully extract information
from SGX enclaves. Lee et al. [41] demonstrated an attack
targeting execution paths, for which they also presented a
defense approach. However, the majority of attacks target data
accesses [10], [9], [62], [49], [27]. Another classification is
based on the victim enclave type. The demonstrated attacks tar-
get either cryptographic algorithms [62], [49], [27] or privacy-
sensitive processing such as genomic indexing [10], [9].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this work we focus on systems that provide an isolated
execution environment that is implemented as an execution
mode of the main CPU. In particular, the CPU’s shared
resources, like caches, are used by all execution modes of the
CPU and thus are shared between isolation domains. Our work
is targeted towards Intel SGX, however, the model also applies
to other architectures like ARM TrustZone [4] or software-
based isolation solutions [47].
The attacker’s capabilities to launch side-channel attacks
might vary for those architectures. We overestimate the adver-
sary’s powers by assuming he can extract a “perfect trace” of
cache events, i.e., he can identify every single cache access
of the program under attack. We will detail on our adversary
model subsequently (Section III-A).
We consider enclaves that process sensitive data in a hostile
environment. Sensitive data in this context are not limited to
cryptographic key, which are the “classical” targets of side-
channel attacks. Instead, sensitive data have to be seen much
broader, for instance, when processing privacy sensitive data
in the cloud. Brasser et al. [9] demonstrated that enclaves
processing genomic data can be attacks using side channels.
Basically, all enclaves will process sensitive data of some kind,
motivating the developer to utilize the isolation properties of
SGX in the first place.
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A. Adversary Model
The adversary’s goal is to extract sensitive information
from an isolated execution environment (or enclave) through a
cache side-channel attack. The adversary can freely configure
and modify all software of the system, including privileged
software like the operating system (OS). He knows the initial
memory layout of the enclave, i.e., the code and initial data
of the enclave. Furthermore, we assume that the adversary can
initiate the enclave arbitrarily often, if the enclave does interact
with an external entity we assume the adversary can simulate
the external entity, e.g., by replaying data when needed.
However, the adversary cannot directly access the memory
of the enclave. The internal processor state (e.g., the CPU
registers) is inaccessible to the adversary, in the event of an
interrupt the state is securely stored in an isolated memory
region. He cannot modify the code or initial data of the
enclave, i.e., the integrity of the enclave is ensured.2
For this work we focus on cache side channels based on
secret-dependent data accesses in memory. Memory accesses
to code can leak sensitive data as well, however, we limit the
scope of this paper to data memory access only and discuss
code randomization in Section IX.
We assume that the adversary has a noise-free cache
side-channel and can obtain a “perfect cache trace” of the
enclave. This means that he can observe all memory accesses
of an enclave, e.g., using a cache attack technique such as
Prime+Probe [53], where the adversary infers information
about the victim’s memory accesses by monitoring evictions in
its own cache lines (the attack works because the victim’s and
the attacker’s memory compete for the same cache lines). He
can precisely determine which cache line has been used by the
enclave and also the order in which the cache lines have been
accessed.3 The adversary cannot extract information which is
more fine grained than accesses to cache lines, i.e., the offset
inside a cache line is not observable to him.
More formally, the perfect trace is an ordered list Λ of
addresses-prefixes accessed by the target enclave. Address-
prefix is the part of an address that determines the cache line
it gets mapped to. On current Intel CPUs the cache line size
is 64 bytes, thus the last six bits of an address are oblivious
to the adversary.4
B. Design Goals
General statements about which memory accesses of a
program could leak information are hard to make in practice.
All memory accesses must be assumed to potentially leak
information if the attacker can associate them with relevant
data elements of structures. For the adversary it is sufficient
to distinguish two memory locations to learn one bit of infor-
mation. Those memory locations could be two different data
structures, e.g., two variables, or different elements within the
same data structure, e.g., different entries in a table. To protect
2In case of SGX the remote attestation mechanism ensures that secret data
is only deployed to unmodified enclaves.
3This assumption is strictly stronger than the adversary’s capabilities in
paging-based side-channel attacks.
4The adversary can combine page-fault side-channel information [79] with
cache side-channel information to distinguish addresses mapping to the same
cache line.
all possible programs, the data structures of a program and the
elements within data structures both need to be randomized.
The goal of our work is to provide a protection mechanism
against side-channel attacks that can be applied to arbitrary
enclave programs without involvement of its developer. In
particular, the developer must not be required to follow any
rules or guidelines for programming his application or add
annotations to the source code. This is important for seam-
less integration of a side-channel defense into the existing
development processes. While annotating “critical” data in
general helps improving the performance of most solutions
it is also error prone for non-security experts. Especially in
non-cryptographic applications it is not always obvious which
accesses to data objects might leak sensitive information.
C. Limitations of Software-only Side-Channel Defenses
Various side-channel defenses have been proposed in the
past. One approach is to modify software such that accesses to
data and/or code are not secret dependent, for instance using
the scatter-gather technique [11]. This approach eliminates the
root cause of side channel vulnerabilities. However, it requires
extensive manual efforts and is therefore only applied to a
small set of software programs (or libraries). Cryptographic
algorithm are natural candidates for this defense approach, the
NaCl library aims at providing side channel resilient imple-
mentations [1]. Xiao et al. [78] suggest that most cryptographic
libraries, like openSSL and mbedTLS, are vulnerable to side-
channel attacks in the adversary model of SGX.
Another approach proposed in the past is based on the
detection of an ongoing side-channel attack. The effects on
the cache of the attack are detected, e.g., through monitoring
cache events using performance counter monitors (PCM) in
hardware [14], [81]. This approach requires either a software
entity like to OS to perform to run the protection (which is
untrusted in the context of SGX), or PCM access for the victim
application (which an enclave cannot).
In the context of SGX two defenses have been proposed as
response to the attack by Xu et al. [79]. T-SGX [65] and De´ja´
Vu [13] allow an enclave to detect when it has been interrupted,
which is an effect of many side-channel attacks [79], [49],
[41]. However, Brasser et al. [9] showed that a side-channel
attack on SGX enclaves can be performed without interrupting
it, thus, these defenses cannot protect against all known side-
channel attacks.
Oblivious RAM [68] provides strong guaranties and could
thwart side-channel attacks. However, ORAM considers a
client server model in which the client can keep meta-data
securely. In the context of SGX the client would be the enclave
while the RAM needs to be considered the untrusted server.
The enclave has no secure storage but needs to store the meta-
data to the RAM and an adversary can observe accesses to the
meta-data as well. Therefore, the meta-data itself needs to be
accesses and process in a oblivious fashion, making ORAM not
easily applicable to SGX. Furthermore, hiding all data accesses
during program execution using ORAM is costly. Oblivious
executions implementations supported by specialized hardware
impose overheads from 5× to 15× [43], [46].
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IV. OUR APPROACH
Our core idea is to break the link between side-channel
observations made by an attacker and the sensitive information
processed by the victim. Side-channel attacks inherently rely
on the fact that the attacker has knowledge about correlation
between an observable effect and the data he aims to extract.
For instance, in a cache-monitoring attack the adversary ob-
serves (indirectly through the cache) which memory locations
are accessed by the victim. From the memory locations the
adversary infers the data elements that were accessed by the
victim. The individual data elements in turn are linked to
the sensitive data the attacker is interested in. Our defense
obfuscates the link between memory locations and data el-
ements. Data elements are located at randomized memory
locations, so that the adversary cannot know from an observed
memory access location which data element was accessed. The
adversary no longer learns which data element was accessed
but only learns that some data element was accessed. Our goal
is to improve enclaves’ security against side-channel attacks.
A. Requirements and Challenges
Below we describe the main challenges to be tackled when
implementing randomization-based side-channel defenses.
1) Semantic Gap: As discussed earlier our goal is to
provide side-channel protection without involvement of the de-
veloper, e.g., source code annotations. Randomization of data
without support by a program’s developer is a challenging task
due to the semantic gap that is inherent to unsafe languages like
C and C++. Currently C and C++ are the only programming
languages officially supported in the software development kit
(SDK) Intel provides for the development of SGX enclaves.
2) Re-randomization: Randomizing the memory layout of
a program once to prevent an adversary to learn which data has
been accessed is not sufficient. The adversary can determine
the relation of memory locations and data objects based on
various information. For instance, if a particular data element
is accessed at predictable point in the program’s execution
the adversary learns the randomized location of that object
by observing memory accesses at this point. Similarly, access
frequency can reveal the randomized location of data elements:
if a particular object is accessed a known number of times
the adversary can identify the object by finding the memory
location that was accessed the correct number of times.
To thwart the adversary in recovering the randomized
memory location of data objects their locations need to be
changed throughout the runtime. Furthermore, the adversary
must not be able to link individual memory accesses to data
objects. In particular, the n-th memory access must not be
related to a particular data object.
3) (Re-)randomization under Adversary Surveillance: All
memory related actions of the program can be observed by
the adversary, including those required during the initial data
randomization and during the re-randomization process. The
initial (un-randomized) memory layout is known to the adver-
sary and he can monitor memory events while data is copied
to its randomized locations. Similarly, when the adversary
recovered information about the randomized location of data
he could link the re-randomization operations. Therefore, the
randomization has to be done in a way whose effects are not
observable by the adversary.
B. DR.SGX
Our solution, a compiler-based tool called DR.SGX, ad-
dresses the design goals and challenges described above by
randomizing all program data at fine granularity and re-
randomizing the data continuously throughout the run time of
the program. Figure 1 shows the high-level design of DR.SGX.
The un-randomized memory layout of the example code shown
on the left allows the adversary to distinguish, for instance,
memory accesses to the first element of array a (a[0])
and the last element (a[31]). As discussed in Section III,
the adversary can distinguish memory accesses at cache line
granularity, i.e., he cannot identify individual elements within
a single cache line. In the example, the variables p, v and i
all reside in the same cache line.
DR.SGX performs randomization at granularity of cache
lines. As shown in Figure 1, a random permutation function
pi is used to reorder the program’s data in memory. The
randomization is based on secret values which are generated
and only accessible inside the enclave and only processed by
cache-monitoring resilient algorithms.
The size of the memory region that holds the data of
an enclave can be adjusted by selecting parameters of the
permutation function pi (Section V details those parameters).
1) Memory Access Instrumentation: DR.SGX performs
randomization on cache line granularity for two reasons: (a)
randomizing at finer granularity provides no advantage in
security, and (b) randomizing in a data structures aware fashion
is impractical due to the semantic gap. DR.SGX randomization
requires that all memory accesses are instrumented, this is
done as a compiler pass. The program code determines the
memory location (i.e., memory address) of the data in the
original, un-randomized layout. Then, before the access is per-
formed, the randomized location of that address is calculated.
The data is then accesses in its new, randomized location.
As we will elaborate in later sections, the cost of perform-
ing the randomization calculation for every memory access
is significant. We overcome this problem by implementing a
“permutation cache” for randomization information We use a
cache-monitoring resilient algorithms to access the permuta-
tion cache, i.e., the randomized location of recently used data
can be looked up and does not need to be computed again.
2) Initial Randomization: The initial randomization of the
enclave’s data needs to be done in a way that cannot be
observed by the adversary, to keep him from learning the
randomization function pi. In particular, if the adversary can
observe a read operation from the un-randomized initial mem-
ory layout and a subsequent write operation to a randomized
address, he can link data structures to the randomized memory
locations. A general approach to break up this linkage is to load
a set of data into CPU registers (register operations cannot
be tracked by the adversary) and write the data in a random
fashion to their new locations. This approach, however, is
limited in the size of the data that can be loaded at once into
registers, enabling the adversary to learn partial information
about the randomized memory layout.
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Initial memory layout (l0) l1 l2
int *p = 0;
void *v;
int i;
int[32] a;
double d = 0;
…
v = a;
i = v[0];
p = a;
i = *(p+31); π1 π2
Example code
λ
Fig. 1. DR.SGX’s memory location randomization design. Throughout the runtime of an enclave its memory layout gets re-randomized based on the permutation
function pi.
DR.SGX uses an initial randomization method which com-
pletely hides write operations from the adversary, using write
operations, known as non-temporal writes [35], that evade the
CPU’s caches. The adversary cannot observe effects of the
write in the cache and cannot extract any information about
the randomized memory layout. Hence, the adversary only
observes reads from the initial, un-randomized memory, whose
layout is known to him beforehand.
3) Re-Randomization: A single randomization of an en-
clave’s memory layout is not sufficient to prevent an adversary
from learning the relation between (randomized) memory
locations and data objects. Therefore, DR.SGX continuously
re-randomizes the memory layout. Starting from the initial
memory layout l0 a random permutation function pi1 is applied
to derive the first randomized layout l1 = pi1(l0). After a
configurable window the memory layout is re-randomized,
applying pi2 to derive l2 = pi2(l1).
Like with the initial randomization, the adversary (who
can observe reads from ln and writes to ln+1) could link
those operations to learn the relation between those memory
layouts. To prevent this, DR.SGX uses non-temporal writes
and does the re-randomization in progressive and probabilistic
manner. Data is not moved from ln to ln+1 in a single bulk
operation that could easily identified by the adversary. Instead
at each point in time two memory layouts exist at the same time
and data is progressively moved from ln to ln+1 interleaving
the “normal” memory operation of the enclave. However,
precisely following this scheme would produce deterministic
accesses which would allow an adversary to tell “normal”
memory access and layout transfer operations apart. To hide
this information the transfer operation are only performed
with probability p making the order of memory accesses non-
deterministic.
Maintaining two memory layouts simultaneously imposes
the challenge that write operations will cause inconsistency
between them. To tackle this problem for each memory access
we need to keep track of which copy is currently valid. We
do this using a pointer λ in the original memory layout l0.
Accesses to addresses a ≤ λ use the newer memory layout
(ln+1), while accesses to addresses a > λ use the previous
layout (ln). In Figure 1, λ is between cache lines 4 and 5. In
the randomized layouts the invalid memory parts are grayed
out. For instance, the variables p, v, i and the first bytes
of array a have been transferred to the new memory layout.
Whenever a cache line is transferred over to the new layout, λ
is incremented by the size of a cache line. After all data has
been copied to the memory layout ln+1 the process starts over
with a new memory layout ln+2.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This sections describes the details of our DR.SGX im-
plementation. We start with the instrumentation process, then
we explain how to randomize the memory layout in a way
that is unobservable to the adversary. Next, we show how we
improved DR.SGX’s performance by introducing a cache for
permutation results. Finally, we discuss the re-randomization
of an enclave’s data sections.
Throughout this section we will refer to data memory
regions or data memory accesses simply as memory regions
and accesses (omitting data). When distinction from code
memory regions or accesses is required, we will use the
appropriate terms.
A. Memory Access Instrumentation
DR.SGX randomizes the memory locations of an SGX
enclave’s data. The enclave, however, has been developed
targeting a linear (virtual) memory model. Each memory
access of an enclave has to be instrumented to determine the
correct randomized memory location of the data element that
is meant to be accessed.
We extended LLVM5 to instrument the enclave code,
working at the intermediate representation (IR) level. Figure 2
shows on the top the high-level compile process of LLVM.
A source file on the left is translated by the compiler front
end, Clang in the case of C / C++, into a LLVM intermediate
representation (IR). The IR is then translated by the back end
into target architecture specific binary code, which in our case
is Intel x86 64-bit.
With DR.SGX the IR file is processed by an instrumen-
tation pass before it is translated into machine code. Further-
more, DR.SGX adds a small library, which contains functions
used to perform the randomization, to the enclave. This library
can be written in a high-level language like C / C++ and is
translated into IR as well.
Additionally, the instrumentation pass examines all alloca-
tions on the stack and transforms those which are larger than
a single cache line into heap allocations. A pointer to the heap
5https://llvm.org/
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allocation is placed on the stack and the code using such a
large element is modified to access the heap allocation instead
of accessing the stack. We will detail on this mechanism in
Section V-C. As an optimization, the instrumentation is not
performed for addresses that the compiler knows to be on the
stack.
Rand.
Lib
IR
C / 
C++
IR BinaryClang
Target
X86_64
Inst. 
Pass
@var = common global [1024 x i32] zeroinitializer, align 16
define i32 @main(i32 %argc, i8** %argv) #0 {
[...]
store i32 42, i32* getelementptr inbounds ↵
([1024 x i32], [1024 x i32]* @var, i64 0, i64 256), align 16
[...]
}
@var = common global [1024 x i32] zeroinitializer, align 16
define i32 @main(i32 %argc, i8** %argv) #0 {
[...]
%store.arg.int = ptrtoint i32* getelementptr inbounds ↵
([1024 x i32], [1024 x i32]* @var, i64 0, i64 256) to i64
%addrencrypt.res.int = call i64 @addrencrypt(i64 %store.arg.int)
%addrencrypt.res = inttoptr i64 %addrencrypt.res.int to i32*
store i32 42, i32* %addrencrypt.res, align 16
[...]
}
Inst.
IR
int var[1024];
int main(int argc, char const *argv[]) {
[...]
var[256] = 42;
[...]
}
Fig. 2. Code instrumentation with DR.SGX. Before each memory access
(read / write) the randomized memory address is calculated. The calculation
is done by a function provided by the DR.SGX library (Rand. lib), which can
be written in C / C++ and gets included in the instrumented binary. The code
snippets show an example of the instrumentation of a store instruction.
Example: In Figure 2 an example for the instrumentation
of a store instruction is given. In the C file the value 42 is
written to the 257-th element of an array var. In IR this
operation is translated into store of a immediate value (42)
to a dereferenced pointer. This pointer is pointing to the un-
randomized location of the array var and needs to be updated.
The instrumented IR (Inst. IR) code shows the modifications
that have been applied by DR.SGX. First, the pointer to
the 257-th element of var is obtained through the use of
getelementptr, and stored as an integer store.arg.int.
Next, the function addrencrypt is called with the pointer to
var as argument. This function is implemented in the DR.SGX
library and resolves the given address to the corresponding
randomized address. The randomized address is assigned to
addrencrypt.res.int, which is afterwards converted into a
pointer addrencrypt.res. Finally, the actual memory access
is performed using the randomized pointer value.
B. Random Permutation
DR.SGX uses run-time data randomization, which is re-
quired for both the unobservable initial randomization as well
as the re-randomizations. This means that the randomized loca-
tion of data must be recovered dynamically. Using a purely ran-
dom permutation would require to store extensive meta-data,
which would then need to be accessed in an unobservable way.
Therefore, DR.SGX uses a pseudo-random permutation func-
tion to determine the random location of data. This approach
has two advantages: (1) collisions are inherently avoided, and
(2) randomized locations can be computed based on a non-
secret algorithm and a key, which is small compared to the
meta-data in the naive approach. However, the permutation
function itself must be resilient against side-channel attacks,
otherwise the adversary learns the randomization secret and
can disclose the accessed cache lines.
We use small domain encryption for our random permuta-
tion function, the domain size must be in the order of memory
size6 used by the enclave employing DR.SGX. We choose a
randomized address space of 4 MB7. In particular, we use the
FFX Format-Preserving Encryption scheme, which is based on
a 10-round Feistel network [6]. As the underlying block cipher
for FFX we used AES, for which the hardware acceleration
extension AES-NI [35] is available in all SGX-enabled CPUs.
AES-NI provides both good performance and resiliency against
cache-based side-channel attacks.
C. Initial Randomization
The initial randomization is particularly challenging since
the adversary knows the initial memory layout of an enclave.
Figure 3 shows the entire memory layout of an enclave with
DR.SGX. If we used standard write operations to copy data
from the initial data section l0 to the randomized section lx,
the adversary would be able to learn the randomized layout.
Copying the data would lead to a memory access trace with
alternating accesses to l0 and lx (each value is read from l0
and written to its randomized location in lx), so the adversary
would learn for each position in lx which element from l0 was
copied there.
In DR.SGX we use non-temporal write instructions to
tackle this problem [35]. Non-temporal write instructions pro-
vide the processor with the meta-information that the data will
not be used again soon by the program and it is not necessary
to store them in the cache. On current Intel processors memory
write operations using this instruction immediately affect the
DRAM and are not buffered in the CPU’s cache.8 This means
the write operations do not cause the written data to be
added in the CPU cache and are therefore invisible to the
adversary. He only observes consecutive accesses to the initial
data section of the enclave l0.
The secret keys we need as input to our random permuta-
tion are generated by the hardware random number generator
from inside the enclave. We use rdseed to obtain true random
numbers from the CPU [35]. This way the adversary cannot
influence or obtain the secret key used by DR.SGX.
The stack of an enclave is not randomized (cf. Figure 3),
however, with DR.SGX it only holds data elements that are
smaller than a cache line. Large data objects, like arrays, are
allocated on the heap and accessed by dereferencing a pointer
placed on the stack. This prevents data leakage through secret-
dependent access within those data objects.
6More precisely, in the order of the memory size divided by the size of a
cache line.
7The addresses inside the randomized address space are 22 bits long and
are conveniently split into a 16-bit cache line index and a 6-bit offset inside
the cache line.
8We verified this behavior on our Skylake test system by issuing a non-
temporal write instruction followed by a read from the same cache line, and
verifying that the read generates a cache miss on all three cache levels.
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Fig. 3. Memory layout of an enclave protected by DR.SGX. Global data and the heap of the enclave are randomized. The stack is only used for data elements
smaller than a cache line, larger data elements are moved to the heap.
D. Permutation Cache
Performing the calculation for pseudo-random permuta-
tions is very costly and needs to be performed for each memory
access. To improve performance we introduced a cache for
memory translations (Perm. Cache in Figure 3). Permutation
is performed at cache line granularity, i.e., all bytes in one
cache line in l0 are mapped as a single block.
When this block is moved to l1 it will, with high probably,
be mapping ta a different cache line, and to yet another cache
line in l2 and so on. On recent x86 processors a cache line is
64 bytes, thus, by storing the result no extra calculations are
necessary for memory accesses that fall within the same cache
line. Our cache is currently 1 KB which allows for a direct-
mapped storage of permutation results for 256 translations.
However, to prevent leakage through our permutation cache
we have to access it in a oblivious way to the adversary.
For each read to the cache we access all CPU cache lines
in our permutation cache, which can be achieved with only
8 unaligned read operations.
E. Re-Randomization
DR.SGX constantly re-randomizes the memory layout of
an enclave. Figure 3 shows the overall memory layout, with
the initial global data and heap in section l0. Initially all data
are copied in a pseudo-random permutation to the first random
section lx. From there, the data is progressively copied to the
second random section ly . As for the initial permutation, non-
temporal write operations are used to hide accesses to ly from
the adversary. For both sections different secret keys are used
to define the permutations.
The data are copied in the order of the original memory
layout (in Figure 3 the first five elements of the initial layout
l0 are in lx, while the remaining are in ly). This scheme
allows to decide quickly which permutation is valid for a given
memory address. As discussed above, on each memory access
an address in the initial layout is permuted.
DR.SGX does re-randomization gradually for each cache
line sized memory block, i.e., one block is updated at a
time. The cost of re-randomization primarily comes from the
permutation calculations required. However, the pipelining of
AES instructions in the CPU makes encrypting a small number
of addresses only slightly more expensive than encrypting a
single address. Therefore, the calculations for re-randomization
are done using a piggybacking scheme, when a memory
element is requested whose address is not in our permutation
cache (cache miss) and that address needs to be computed
anyway.
Predictable re-randomization operations, however, can be
filtered out by the adversary, since we assume that the ad-
versary has a perfect trace of memory accesses. To overcome
this challenge the re-randomization actions are made proba-
bilistic in DR.SGX. On each cache miss a re-randomization is
performed with a configurable probability p. After multiple re-
randomization steps the uncertainty for the adversary becomes
too high for a reliable side-channel attack.
Re-randomizing only on cache-miss events in the permu-
tation cache has the disadvantage that application-dependent
cache-misses can be rare events. In such a case the re-
randomization would not be sufficient to provide good pro-
tection against side-channel attacks. Therefore, we introduce a
new configurable parameter t, of forced cache miss threshold.
If t− 1 cache hits happen consecutively, the following lookup
is treated as a cache miss, regardless of the actual cache
status. Like all cache misses, a new line is re-randomized with
probability p. This way we can enforce a lower bound on the
re-randomization rate of DR.SGX.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluated the performance of DR.SGX using the bench-
mark suite Nbench [12]. Benchmarking SGX code can be
challenging, since well-known benchmark suites rely on a
number of features, including system calls, timestamps, and
the file system, which are not directly available in SGX.
We chose Nbench because it has been previously used to
analyze the performance, e.g., of SGX-Shield [64]. It relies
only marginally on the file system and it is relatively simple
(5217 lines of code), so it can be easily adapted to run inside
an SGX enclave. The original version relies on timestamps
to run each benchmark for an equal amount of time; since
timestamps are not available in SGX enclaves we manually
chose for each benchmark the lowest number of iterations that
yielded a run time greater than 100 ms. Our test system has
an Intel Skylake i7-6700 processor clocked at 3.40 GHz and
runs Ubuntu 14.04.4.
a) Overhead of DR.SGX modifications: To understand
the impact of the various components of DR.SGX, we ran the
benchmark multiple times with a subset of the components (see
Section V). We first tested moving bigger allocations from the
stack to the heap, i.e., replacing allocations on the stack bigger
than 63 bytes with calls to malloc. We measured a negligible
overhead well below 1% (Stack → Heap in Figure 4). Then,
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we tested the instrumentation of reads and writes (LLVM
instruction getelementptr). In DR.SGX, instances of that
instruction are followed by calls to our permutation function,
unless the argument to the instruction is on the stack. In this
test, the permutation function returns its parameter immedi-
ately, so the overhead reflects the impact of the instrumentation
alone. We measured overheads between 0 and 96%, with a
geometric mean of 40% (GEP inst. in Figure 4). Finally,
we tested the whole system (without any forced cache miss
threshold). We chose a value of 0.5 for the re-randomization
probability p. Overheads range between 0.36× and 19.68×,
with a geometric mean of 3.39×. The benchmarks Assign
and LU have the biggest overheads, 16.22× and 19.68×
respectively, due to high miss rate in our permutation cache.
Those benchmarks have a cache miss rate above 1 time every
thousand CPU cycles, while the other benchmarks have an
average cache miss rate of 0.12 times every thousand CPU
cycles.
b) Overhead of re-randomization: Next, we assessed
the impact of various forced cache miss thresholds on the
overhead and the re-randomization rate. We chose our forced
cache miss thresholds t ∈ {256, 64, 16} but other values
are possible. As a measure of the re-randomization rate, we
compute the average number of memory events, i.e., reads
or writes to the randomized area, during a re-randomization
cycle. Figure 6 shows this measure for the benchmarks and the
various thresholds. Figure 5 compares the overhead using the
various thresholds. The data points in Figures 7 and 8 represent
the geometric means of the overhead and the re-randomization
rate respectively, while the colored areas represent the mini-
mum and maximum values.
As mentioned, the geometric mean of the performance
overhead without a forced cache miss threshold is 3.39×
and the maximum is 19.68×. The geometric mean of the
memory events per re-randomization is 18.6M, mainly because
of benchmarks like StringSort and NNET which have a very
high cache hit rate (99.99999% and 99.99977% respectively)
and, thus, up to 1.7×1011 memory events per re-randomization
cycle.
Introducing a high forced cache miss threshold (t = 256)
effectively reduces the memory events per cycle: the geometric
mean is 1.5M, while the maximum is 4.0M (a reduction of
five orders of magnitude). On the other hand, the performance
overhead only increases slightly: the geometric mean is 4.01×
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settings.
while the maximum is 19.80×. The lowest threshold we
considered is t = 16, which further reduces the number
of memory events per re-randomization cycle: the geometric
mean is 0.23M (maximum: 0.28M, a further reduction of an
order of magnitude). The geometric mean of the performance
overhead is in this case 9.33× (maximum: 23.30×). The best
compromise is t = 64, where the geometric mean of the
number of memory events per cycle is 0.62M (maximum:
1.1M) while the geometric mean of the performance overhead
is 5.20× (maximum: 19.84×). Using t = 64 the overhead
increases only slightly (the maximum overhead is practically
the same) but the maximum number of memory events per
randomization cycle decreases by a factor of 160000.
c) Summary: Although the performance overhead is
substantial (e.g., 5.2× for parameters t = 64 and p = 0.5),
we argue that our solution is still practical in many use cases.
Oblivious execution system that leverage customized hardware
impose similar or higher overheads (e.g., 5× in [43] and 15×
in [46]), so implementing similar protections fully in software
would be significantly slower compared to our approach.
Developers and system administrators can adjust the pa-
rameters of DR.SGX based on the available computing re-
sources. For example, if the deployment scenario allows up to
10× overhead, the cache miss threshold can be set to t = 16
for maximal re-randomization rate and security (see Figure 7).
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Fig. 7. Geometric mean of the overhead, with different FCM settings. The
colored area shows the minimum and the maximum values.
Fig. 8. Geometric mean of the number of memory events per re-
randomization cycle, with different FCM settings. The colored area shows
the minimum and the maximum values.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze security of DR.SGX and demon-
strate that it provides significant security improvements com-
pare to vanilla enclaves.
Prerequisites We recall that we consider a strong adversary
model (cf. Section III-A) where the attacker has access to
the source code of the enclave and can obtain a “perfect
cache trace” of ordered events, which precisely records all
cache events of a victim in sequential order. In practice,
attackers typically have to additionally deal with noise in the
side channel, which is introduced by, e.g., interrupts that can-
not be completely eliminated even by privileged adversaries.
Furthermore, state-of-the-art attack techniques (e.g., [9], [62],
[49], [27]) do not provide sufficient accuracy and resolution
necessary for capturing all the cache events. By considering
such a strong model that over-approximates typical adversarial
capabilities, we ensure our solution can defeat attacks of
today’s adversaries as well as potential future adversaries that
might develop more effective attack techniques.
We would also like remind the reader that our solution does
not intend to completely eliminate information leakage through
side channels, but rather aims to provide improved security
at more reasonable performance cost than, e.g., ORAM solu-
tions [68], [59]. Hence, in the following we discuss possible
forms of leakage, respective attack scenarios and elaborate how
well DR.SGX covers them.
A. Random guessing attacks
In the most simple scenario, the attacker identifies the
part of the cache trace that includes accesses to the secret-
dependent data structure (e.g., a hash table). While such
identification is going to be quite challenging task in practice
(as we elaborate later on in section VII-C), we assume for
a moment that it can be done, e.g., by running the non-
randomized version of the victim enclave, and counting the
number of cache events from the beginning of execution
until secret-dependent memory access occurrence. By using
this information the attacker can find the location of secret-
dependent memory accesses in the trace of a randomized
enclave, which is likely to be at the same location.
As a next step, the attacker attempts to reverse-engineer the
permutation of elements within the data structure. In particular,
when observing k secret-dependent and distinctive accesses to
the object of n elements, the search space will be given by an
arrangement of k from n: Akn =
n!
(n−k)! .
This number grows rapidly with the size of n, making it
non-trivial for an attacker to brute-force permutation even for
objects of moderate size. For example, given a data structure
of 50 elements and any number of secret-dependent accesses
resulting in 25 distinctive accesses to the data structure, the
amount of arrangements is as large as 1.96E+39, which gives
the chance of a random guess of approximately 2−131, which
is smaller than the probability to guess an AES-128 key.
B. Predictable and secret-dependent access
In the second attack scenario, a victim enclave exhibits
predictable access pattern, e.g., it initializes a security sensitive
data structure in a deterministic order, which is known to the
attacker from the source code. Hence, it becomes possible
to disclose information about permuted memory locations by
analyzing access pattern of such deterministic routines in the
permuted trace.
To defeat this type of attacks, DR.SGX uses probabilistic
gradual re-randomization as the enclave execution progresses
(cf. Section IV-A2). Thus, the amount of leaked information
and, hence, security guarantees provided are dependent on
two factors: (i) the attack window a, which denotes the
part of the trace that includes both, deterministic and secret-
dependent accesses to the same data structure, and on (ii) re-
randomization window T , which is a security parameter that
determines the length of the trace without re-randomization.
The smaller the window T is, the higher the chances that the
memory layout is re-randomized in between deterministic and
secret-dependent accesses.
Our randomization strategy is to periodically perform re-
randomization, which eventually will take place with the given
probability. This can be modeled as the number of Bernoulli
trials performed until a success occurs, which follow the
geometric distribution. Therefore, let Xi be a geometrical
distributed random variable with success factor p, with Xi
denoting the number of re-randomization trials performed until
re-randomization takes place, and p being the success proba-
bility of re-randomization trial. For the geometric distribution,
the expected (mean) number of trials up to and including the
first success is 1p .
Furthermore, DR.SGX re-randomizes one cache line sized
memory block at a time, which means that N re-randomization
iterations are needed in order to re-randomize the entire
memory region of size N · (cache line size). Hence, the
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expected mean of complete re-randomization window T can
be expressed as: T = ∆T · N · 1p , where ∆T is a basic re-
randomization window (in a number of cache events)9, N is
the size of the protected memory region, and p is the success
probability of the re-randomization trial. For example, for ∆T
= 1, N = 4 Mb/64 bytes and p = 0.5: T = 216.
Note that the attack probability depends on the victim
enclave, and in particular on the enclave specific attack window
a. Furthermore, it also depends on the alignment of the re-
randomization window T with the attack window a in the
trace. In particular, T should begin before or together with
a and end with or after it, otherwise there is a chance that
locations of the secret-dependent data entries are affected by
re-randomization. Assuming that |a| = m1, |T | = m2, the
attack probability can be expressed as follows:
Pattack =
{
(m2−m1+1)
m2
if m1 ≤ m2
0, otherwise
Generally, the sooner secret-dependent memory accesses
happen after deterministic initialization, the narrower the attack
window a becomes and the harder it gets to ensure that re-
randomization window T is even tighter (i.e., to ensure that
condition m1 > m2 holds). Hence, it is not far stretched to
assume that some fraction of enclaves will be susceptible to
this attack if no additional countermeasures are taken.
As an additional countermeasure, we resort to the next line
of defense provided by DR.SGX. In particular, we observe
that our progressive re-randomization introduces noise in a
side channel as a side effect. In more details, re-randomization
of each memory address adds additional memory accesses10.
Because re-randomization happens in interleaving manner with
enclave execution, these accesses cannot be distinguished from
accesses made by the enclave’s application logic.
The noise is added with a given probability p at intervals
∆T . Hence, it can be modeled as a sequence of Bernoulli trials
with one of two possible outcomes, true or false, where ‘true’
represents the event of noise injection and ‘false’ otherwise. A
sequence of Bernoulli trials that counts the number of ‘true’
occurrences can be modeled as a random variable that follows
binomial distribution. The probability mass function of the
binomial experiment is as follows: P (k;n, p) = Pr(X = k) =(
n
k
)
pkqn−k, k = 0, 1, ..., n, where
(
n
k
)
is a binomial coefficient,
and P (k;n, p) represents probability that there will be k ‘true’
outcomes among n trials.
Therefore, the probability of finding how many ‘true’
events have happened within k attempts is given by the c.d.f.
of the binomial distribution:
F (k;n, p) = Pr(X ≤ k) = ∑bkci=0 (ni)pi(1− p)n−i.
This implies that the larger n becomes, the harder it gets
for the attacker to find the exact number of ‘true’ events. This
becomes particularly difficult for privacy-sensitive applications
operating on large volumes of private data, such as genomic
indexing or machine learning algorithms.
9In our implementation our re-randomization window is represented by the
distance between two cache misses.
10In particular, re-randomization adds one read access and one non-temporal
write, however non-temporal writes are not observable in the cache
C. Noise filtering
The attacker might try to filter out noise introduced by our
progressive re-randomization by collecting multiple execution
traces and averaging the noise out – the typical strategy
used by adversaries dealing with noisy channels. However,
our periodical re-randomization breaks correlation between
different traces, because any observations made in previous re-
randomization window become useless after re-randomization.
Hence, the attacker is prevented from combining traces of
different executions. Alternatively, the attacker might try to
combine different segments of the same trace, if they are all
from the same re-randomization window. This might be useful
in cases when the victim enclave periodically performs secret-
dependent memory accesses within single execution (e.g.,
when encrypting multiple blocks using a block cipher). Even in
such a case, the attacker is heavily limited by re-randomization
in the amount of useful trace segments he could collect. For
instance, when running IDEA benchmark we observed that it
performed about 300 decryptions in total, while the address
space was re-randomized 8.8 times This allows an attacker to
collect 34 equal randomized traces (of the decryption routine)
at most. On another hand, effective noise filtering typically
requires significant more repetitions. For instance, the attack
by Go¨tzfried et al. [27] required traces of 9600 decryptions to
reveal AES key, while the attack by Brasser et al. [9] leaked
70% of RSA key in ca. 300 repetitions.
D. Frequency-based access analysis
The next attack vector uses the fact that repetitive accesses
patterns might be recognizable even in permuted memory
layouts. This might ease the attacker’s analysis by, e.g., helping
him to align traces for noise filtering or for localizing secret-
dependent memory accesses in the trace. For instance, let us
assume that non-randomized enclave produces 100 accesses to
addr01 address, which is permuted to addr53 and addr76 in
the first and the second trace, respectively. When the attacker
observes 53 53 53 53 ... hundred times in a first trace and
76 76 76 76 28 76 76 ... in the second trace, he might learn
that in the second trace the re-randomization took place and
can filter noise (28) out. As a countermeasure, we introduce an
additional parameter t which we refer to as forced cache miss
threshold, which enforces an additional cache miss whenever
the number of cache hits reaches the threshold. This in
turn triggers additional re-randomization round which injects
additional noise as a side effect, thus effectively breaking the
repetitive sequence.
E. Summary
To summarize, DR.SGX provides better security guarantees
to enclaves with larger security sensitive data structures, and
to those that do not use security sensitive structures immedi-
ately after their initialization. Furthermore, if enclaves do not
provide the means to verify correctness of a guessed secret, it
becomes practically impossible to filter out noise or guess the
permutation of a data structure.
Overall, DR.SGX provides significantly better security
guarantees than a baseline, vanilla enclaves running without
any protection. Furthermore, DR.SGX’s security parameters
provide the flexibility to achieve good trade-offs between
performance and security guarantees.
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VIII. DISCUSSION
a) Leakage quantification: Quantification of cache-
based information leakage has been studied in previous works.
CacheAudit [21] is a static analysis framework that given an
x86 binary and a cache configuration yields an upper bound on
the amount of information leakage via cache- and time-based
side-channels. The information leakage is quantified based on
the number of side-channel observations an attacker can obtain.
In the model of CacheAudit, randomly permuted observations
contribute to the total number of observations, even though
the attacker may not learn any useful information from such
accesses. Therefore, CacheAudit is not directly suitable for
analyzing our defense. Zhang and Lee [80] modeled the
cache as a finite state machine to analyze how well various
cache architectures defend against side-channel attacks. The
leakage is quantified using mutual information, which can
be computed using a model-checking tool. Unfortunately, the
currently available finite state machine models do not capture
our defense; hence, we cannot directly use their tool to analyze
our solution. Extending these tools to analyze our approach
would be an interesting direction for future work, but beyond
the scope of this paper.
b) Cryptographic vs. non-cryptographic enclaves: We
notice that properties like repetitive use of the same secret
in a single execution and the availability of means to verify
correctness of guessing attempts (e.g., plaintext/cyphertext
pairs) are typical for cryptographic algorithms, that are usu-
ally implemented by security experts and are often hardened
against side channel attacks at source code level.
On the other hand, larger security sensitive data structures
and long gaps between initialization routines and secret-
dependent accesses are common in non-cryptographic al-
gorithms, such as genomic indexing and machine learning.
Furthermore, these algorithms typically operate on secret data
rather than cryptographic keys, hence, the attacker cannot eas-
ily verify the correctness of guesses. In our opinion, providing
a protection mechanism for non-cryptographic applications is
most desirable, as they are typically implemented by develop-
ers without any security background. While developers might
not be able to select the right security level for their enclaves,
they can estimate acceptable performance penalties for their
applications. Based on this they can get the best possible
security guarantees within their performance requirements.
IX. RELATED WORK
In this section we review side-channel attacks on SGX and
compare existing countermeasures to our solution.
a) SGX side-channel attacks: Intel has acknowledged
that SGX may be susceptible to side-channel attacks [36].
Costan et al. [15] hypothesized possible attack strategies, but
did not implement a concrete attack. The first demonstrated
attack was by Xu et al. [79] who leveraged monitoring of
(forced) page faults. The attack exploits the fact that the
untrusted OS is responsible for enclave memory management,
including paging. Lee et al. [41] implemented a side-channel
attack, called branch shadowing, that reveals fine-grained con-
trol flow information of an SGX enclave. The attack exploits
the fact that SGX does not clear the branch history cache on
context switch.
Several recent works have shown that also shared caches
can leak confidential enclave data. Brasser et al. [9] imple-
mented a customized version of Prime+Probe that leverages
Intel Performance Monitoring Counters (PMC) to mount an
L1 cache attack on RSA decryption and a human genome
processing library (with 40 repetitions the attack leaks patterns
used for person identification during DNA sequence indexing).
The attack does not interrupt the victim enclave to avoid de-
tection [13]. Schwarz et al. [62] demonstrated that a malicious
enclave can launch a cross-core L3 cache attack on other
software running on the system (enclave or normal process).
By monitoring roughly 340 mbedTLS RSA decryptions the
malicious enclave can recover 96% of the victim private key.
Moghimi et al. [49] implemented an L1 cache attack on AES
that monitors AES S-Box accesses. By interrupting the victim
at a high frequency they were able to extract a secret key
in 10 iterations (for simple AES implementations). Go¨tzfried
et al. [27] leverage PMCs to mount an L1 cache attack on
AES. They assume that the attacker is synchronized with the
victim enclave for more precise priming and probing. The
attack required 9600 decryptions to reveal the key.
b) Code randomization: Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR) [57] is a known defensive technique
against memory corruption attacks (e.g. ROP [60]). ASLR
hides the locations of mapped memory (code and data) regions
by randomizing their offsets at load time. More fine-grained
solutions randomize code (but not data) at function [38],
basic block [75], [18], and single instruction [56], [31] level.
Static randomization solutions require that the memory layout
remains secret. However, this assumption has been shown to
be invalid [69], [63], [8], [67]. A countermeasure is to re-
randomize the memory layout at runtime. Bigelow et al. [7]
observe that re-randomizing the memory layout between every
program output and input is sufficient to defend against attack-
ers who are limited to observing the output of a program.
Shuffler [77] implements continuous code re-randomization
during execution.
The aforementioned randomization techniques are insuffi-
cient to defend against privileged SGX adversaries that mount
side-channel attacks. Traditional offset-based ASLR is not
effective since the attacker is responsible for memory manage-
ment and thus learns the “secret” randomized offsets. Also, any
form of code (re-)randomization, and in particular fine-grained
code randomization as implemented in SGX-Shield [64], is
ineffective against attacks that only monitor data accesses
(e.g. [62], [79], [9]). The attacker is not limited to observing
program outputs, but can additionally observe the memory
access pattern during victim enclave execution.
The fine-grained code randomization techniques are not
easily applicable to data, where similar “randomizable units”,
such as functions or code blocks, are not available. Also,
reliably tracking data pointers is a harder problem than tracking
code pointers [7]. The C standard mandates that a function
pointer cannot be casted into another data type, but no limita-
tions are imposed on data pointers. A typical C program also
contains many more data pointers than code pointers, which
makes dynamic data pointer tracking expensive [7].
Crane et al.[17] use dynamic software diversity to thwart
side-channel attacks. Multiple, diversified code copies of a pro-
gram are created and loaded in parallel. During the execution
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the currently executed copy is dynamically switched, leading
to unpredictable effects in the side channel. This approach,
however, is only applicable to read-only memory elements,
like code. Using the same approach for data would lead to
inconsistency between the copies.
c) ORAM and oblivious execution: Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [24], [25] and its variants [68], [59], [26], [76] hide
the memory access pattern of a trusted client (e.g., CPU or
network client) to an untrusted and encrypted memory (e.g.,
DRAM or server) by introducing fake accesses and shuffling
the encrypted memory elements such that the observable
access pattern is independent of the actual access pattern.
The performance of ORAM depends on the amount of secure
memory available within the trusted client. State-of-the-art
schemes, like Path ORAM [68] and Ring ORAM [59], incur
memory bandwidth overhead in the order of 100×.
Oblivious execution [46], [44], [43] techniques attempt to
hide all observable effects of program execution, including
both memory accesses (code and data) and timing information.
The goal is that an attacker cannot distinguish executions of
a program on one input from executions on different inputs.
Oblivious execution on standard processor architectures is ex-
tremely expensive, and thus oblivious execution systems typi-
cally leverage customized hardware. GhostRider [43] combines
a new FPGA hardware design with ORAM. Phantom [46] is
an ORAM-based oblivious processor whose memory controller
leverages bank parallelism in DRAM chips to improve perfor-
mance. Depending on the workload, GhostRider and Phantom
incur a performance overhead in the order of 5× to 15×.
In the context of SGX, Raccoon [58] provides oblivious
data access for developer-annotated enclave data by modifying
the enclave source code. Secret-dependent memory accesses
are hidden by either using ORAM or by streaming over the
entire data structure. Also, decoy paths are introduced such
that all program paths exhibit the same observable effects. Ze-
roTrace [61] is an oblivious data structure framework for SGX
that runs on top of a software memory controller. Currently,
oblivious arrays, lists, and dictionaries are supported, but the
framework could be extended with additional data structures.
Also, oblivious implementations of specific libraries have
been proposed. Ohrimenko et al. propose data-oblivious ma-
chine learning algorithms [52] and a side-channel resilient
MapReduce framework [51]. These techniques, however, are
not applicable to arbitrary enclaves.
d) Hardware-assisted memory bus protection: The se-
quence of memory accesses appearing on the untrusted mem-
ory bus can reveal information about the execution of a
program [42], [70]. Several defenses that decorrelate the actual
memory accesses of a program from the memory accesses
appearing on the memory bus have been proposed.
HIDE [83] is a hardware-assisted mechanism that breaks
the correlation between repeated accesses by permuting the
address space at well-defined execution points. An integral
part is the ability to lock cache lines, which requires changing
contemporary cache architectures. Shuffle [82] augments the
CPU chip with a shuffle buffer that allows to randomly shuffle
memory blocks such that a memory block is written to a new
location each time the block leaves the CPU chip. Gao et
al. [22] propose a lightweight hardware-assisted scheme that
reduces the high number of memory accesses in HIDE, as
well as the high number of page faults in the Shuffle scheme.
ObfusMem [5] assumes that both the processor and DRAM are
trusted and hides access patterns with randomized encryption.
The proposed hardware modifications are not available in
current SGX processors. Although our defense was designed
to defend against cache attacks, it also addresses leakage on
the memory bus (as all observed addresses are randomized).
e) New cache architectures: Cache partitioning
schemes [19], [54], [55], [71], [73], [74], [20] divide the
cache into partitions that are not shared between processes.
A static-partition cache [80] statically divides the cache
such that different processes do not share any cache lines,
while partition-locked caches [73] allow more fine-grained
partitioning by giving a process the capability of locking a
cache line, meaning that another process cannot evict this
cache line until it is unlocked. This allows, for example, to
securely implement AES by preloading the S-boxes.
Cache access obfuscation techniques [39], [74], [37], [45],
[40], [72], [73] obfuscate the side-channel information ob-
tained by the attacker, either by introducing noise or by
randomizing the address to cache line mapping. A random
eviction cache [80] adds noise to the channel by periodi-
cally evicting a random cache line. A random permutation
cache [73] uses a dynamic random memory address to cache
line mapping (note that traditional caches have a static de-
terministic mapping that is known to an attacker). Since this
random mapping is dynamically updated and unknown to
the adversary he learns nothing about which memory was
accessed.
Due to the limited control over caches in contemporary
SGX processors it is not feasible to implement cache parti-
tioning in software. Cache obfuscation techniques on the other
hand can be implemented in software. Similarly to a random
permutation cache, our defense dynamically randomizes the
observations of an adversary.
f) Software-only side-channel defenses for SGX: Some
SGX side-channel attacks rely on frequently interrupting the
victim enclave (e.g. [79], [41], [49]). T-SGX [65] and De´ja´
Vu [13] are compiler-based defensive mechanisms to detect
malicious enclave interrupts from inside an enclave. Upon
detection the enclave can take counteractive measures, such as
simply stopping its execution. T-SGX [65] leverages the Intel
Transactional Synchronization Extension (TSX) to detect syn-
chronous enclave exits. De´ja´ Vu [13] monitors the execution
time of an enclave to detect a slowdown caused by frequent
enclave interrupts, which allows to detect both synchronous
and asynchronous enclave exits. However, SGX cache-attacks
that do not rely on interrupting the victim enclave [9], [62],
[27] are not prevented.
Cloak [28] uses transactional memory (TSX) to preform
atomic memory operations (i.e., memory operations that cannot
be intercepted by the adversary) that hide sensitive memory
accesses. Before sensitive memory is accessed all cache lines
are touched (primed) by the enclave. The cache observing
adversary always sees that all cache lines have been accessed,
and thus learns nothing about the enclave’s sensitive accesses.
Cloak relies on the enclave’s developer to annotate sensitive
data structures to be protected from side-channel attacks.
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DR.SGX does not require the developer to identify sensitive
data, the developer only has to tune DR.SGX’s security-
performance trade-off, which requires no security expertise.
g) Memory-less encryption: Memory-less encryption
has been studied motivated by cold-boot attacks [30], [29].
TRESOR [50] provides memory-less AES encryption by using
the x86 debug registers for secure key storage. At boot time
the kernel loads the AES key into the debug registers and
afterwards ensures that the contents of the debug registers are
neither modified nor written to memory. Loop-Amnesia [66]
implements memory-less disk encryption by storing a ran-
domly generated master secret, which is used to encrypt the
disk volume key for each mounted volume, in model-specific
(CPU) registers. PRIME [23] implements optimized memory-
less RSA encryption by storing non-critical or symmetrically
encrypted intermediary values in DRAM. These schemes are
similar to our implementation of permutation computation.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed semantic agnostic data ran-
domization as a novel defensive approach against cache-based
side-channel attacks on SGX. Our tool DR.SGX instruments
enclave code such that all data locations in enclave memory are
permuted at cache-line granularity and re-randomized during
execution. Our solution prevents many cache attacks effec-
tively and provides a complementary way to harden enclaves
against information leakage.
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